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Abstract: Governments have long standing interests in preventing market failures and enhancing 
innovation in strategic industries. Public policy regarding domestic technology is critical to both 
national security and economic prosperity. Governments often seek to enhance their global 
competitiveness by promoting private sector cooperative activity at the inter-organizational level. 
Research on network governance has illuminated the structure of boundary-spanning 
collaboration mainly for programs with immediate public or non-profit objectives. Far less 
research has examined how governments might stimulate private sector cooperation to prevent 
market failures or to enhance innovation. The theoretical contribution of this research is to 
suggest that government programs might catalyze cooperative activity by stimulating the 
preferential attachment mechanism inherent in social networks. We analyze the long-term effects 
of a government program on the strategic alliance network of 451 organizations in the high-tech 
semiconductor industry between 1987 and 1999, using recently developed stochastic network 
analysis methods for longitudinal social networks.  
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1. Introduction 
Governments have long standing interests in science and technology for at least two primary 
reasons. First, technology is critical to the continued prosperity of nations that seek to secure a 
high standard of living for their citizens, fueled in part by dramatic enhancements in consumer 
goods, telecommunications technology, automobiles, optoelectronics, and computers (Salter and 
Martin 2001). Second, technology is critical to national security and the development of weapon 
systems, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and rapidly 
evolving applications of artificial intelligence (Mowery 1998). For these reasons, among others, 
nations often seek to enhance their competitiveness through science and technology (S&T) 
policy (Taylor 2016).  
In a recent notable example, China has rapidly increased national research and 
development (R&D) spending over the past two decades, invested heavily in U.S. firms to 
acquire technology and intellectual property, often engaging in illicit transfers, and expanded 
intelligence collection on innovation targets. Together these efforts form the elements of a 
strategy to fuel economic growth and enhance military capabilities (Deutch 2018). This type of 
technology-oriented strategy is by no means new, and many developed nations invest heavily in 
national systems of science and technology. Nation states seeking to compete in the international 
system often attempt to gain advantage through scientific and technological development (Taylor 
2016). The U.S. has maintained coherent national science and technology policies focusing on 
military strength and domestic prosperity since at least World War II (Bush 1945; Smith 2011).  
A unique example from 1987 occurred when the United States intervened in the global 
high-technology market during a critical period of potential domestic market failure through a 
government sponsored non-profit research consortium, called Sematech (Browning, Beyer, and 
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Shetler 1995; Ham, Linden, and Appleyard 1998; Browning and Shetler 2000; Carayannis and 
Alexander 2004). In contrast to direct subsidies, tariffs, illicit transfers from foreign competitors, 
and the creation of state-owned enterprises, the approach of Sematech represents a less well-
known policy tool that encourages inter-organizational cooperation around shared public 
objectives. This article brings the organizational/administrative elements of S&T policy into 
focus and recontextualizes an exemplar case given new conceptual and methodological tools in 
network governance (Provan and Kenis 2008; Klijn and Koopenjan 2015) and stochastic social 
network analysis (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013; Snijders et al. 2010; Lubell et al. 2012).  
The general theoretical proposition of this article is that government intervention might 
act as a network catalyst for inter-organizational cooperation by acting on the preferential 
attachment mechanism inherent to many social networks. While the high-technology sector 
provides a unique case, the theoretical logic may generalize to other public policy relevant 
sectors with a history of, or potential for, cooperative activity. Previous research provides 
evidence that Sematech was a critical element in a broader industrial policy that enhanced the 
performance of U.S. firms (e.g. Irwin and Klenow 1996). This article takes a step back from 
performance effects to pose two broader research questions concerning intermediate network 
properties. Does cooperative activity between organizations in the high-tech sector exhibit 
preferential attachment? What role do governments play in stimulating preferential attachment in 
the global alliance network in the high-technology sector? The broader purpose of this research 
is to build theory regarding the role of government in stimulating cooperative inter-
organizational activity. 
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2. Background  
Today the global high-technology sector is structured as a global network of cooperative 
interactions between organizations. The sector did not always resemble a network but was once 
dominated by organizations in relative isolation. In the semiconductor industry, which is the 
backbone of the computing and microelectronics industries, a unique innovation trajectory took 
hold in the latter half of the 20th century, referred to as Moore’s Law. Named after former 
president of Intel, Moore suggested that the number of transistors packed onto an integrated 
circuit would double roughly every two years (Epicoco 2011). This non-linear innovation 
trajectory reached a point during the 1970s and 1980s where firms increasingly began to 
cooperate on research and development (R&D) in order to remain competitive (Hagedoorn 
2001). As the technological landscape shifted toward cooperative behavior between 
organizations, the Japanese conglomerate system of networked organization, called Keiretsu, 
was in a favorable position and rapidly achieved market dominance (Lincoln, Gerlach, and 
Takahashi 1992). Industry leaders and U.S. lawmakers were extremely worried about the loss of 
majority global market share, which occurred in the mid-1980s, in an industry that was a U.S. 
invention and dominated by U.S. firms since its inception. 
In order to counteract the threat from Japan, the U.S. congress and industry leaders 
crafted the government sponsored non-profit research consortium, Sematech, abbreviated from 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology. Through the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the consortium received matching 
funds of $100 million per year for a ten-year period between 1987 and 1996 (Browning and 
Shetler 2000). The consortium began with participation by fourteen U.S. firms, which accounted 
for roughly 80% of total U.S. manufacturing capacity, and excluded foreign participants 
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(Browning, Beyer, and Shetler 1995). Members to the consortium contributed one percent of 
sales, or one million dollars per year, and contributed human capital to the fabrication facility in 
Austin, Texas called Fab One (Browning and Shetler 2000). The primary objectives of the 
consortium were to improve manufacturing process quality and to innovate along the 
miniaturization trajectory of Moore’s Law. Leadership and governance were established by the 
members, and DOD played a very hands-off role (Beyer and Browning 1999). In 1996 Sematech 
opened membership to foreign firms and DOD matching funds ended, but the consortium 
continued to function as a non-profit organization.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 This article relies on three broad sources of literature to motivate hypotheses regarding 
potential effects of government action on inter-organizational networks. The first section applies 
network governance theory to conceptualize cross-sector inter-organizational cooperation. The 
second section applies the literature on complexity science, which specifies a unique relational 
ontology well-suited to the study of networks and highlights specific mechanisms of action. The 
third section applies the concept of network interventions to suggest why, when, and with what 
consequences decision makers might choose to intervene in social networks. Combining these 
sources of literature suggests how governments might catalyze network emergence.   
Network Governance: As government has become less hierarchical and less centralized 
over the last few decades, the study of cross-sector interorganizational networks has become far 
more common (Koliba et al. 2019). The New Public Management movement and the emergence 
of the “hollow state” (Milward & Provan 2000) described a situation where governments 
increasingly rely on market-based mechanisms to achieve public ends. For example, contracting 
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for products and services (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2018) and public-private partnerships 
(Hart 2003; Hodge & Greve 2007) provide viable alternatives to traditional hierarchical within-
organization service delivery, i.e. the “make or buy” decision (Brown & Potoski 2003; Johansson 
2015). Similarly, policy networks and collaborative governance regimes emerged to tackle 
wicked public problems in a variety of areas from natural resource management (Berardo and 
Scholz, 2010) and environmental protection (Emerson & Nabatchi 2015), to emergency 
management (Kapucu 2006), and public health (Provan & Milward 1995).  
The common thread between these alternative modes of public problem resolution is that 
they involve cooperation between organizations rather than vertical integration within a single 
bureaucracy. Sometimes these cooperative inter-organizational linkages are merely a series of 
dyads with little to no cross-connection. This might be the case with bilateral contracts and 
public-private partnerships. However, as the number of cooperative linkages between 
organizations increase, there is a greater probability that a complex network structure emerges. 
Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) suggest that the transaction costs of cooperation between 
organizations increase their structural embeddedness, which in turn produces the need for 
governance strategies to adapt, coordinate, and safeguard an evolving network of exchanges. In 
these scenarios, traditional government approaches to address market failures and support 
innovation may prove ineffective or counterproductive.   
Klijn and Koopenjan (2015:11) define governance networks as “more or less stable 
patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which cluster around policy 
problems, a policy programme, and/or a set of resources and which emerge, are sustained, and 
are changed through a series of interactions”. Governance, as an activity of government agencies 
within such networks, is defined as a “set of conscious steering attempts or strategies of actors 
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within governance networks aimed at influencing interaction processes and/or the characteristics 
of these networks”. Further, the more specific activity of management, is defined as “all the 
deliberate strategies aimed at facilitating and guiding the interactions and/or changing the 
features of the network with the intent to further the collaboration within the network processes”. 
These definitions suggest that public problems tend to generate complex patterns of social 
interaction which might be enhanced or mitigated to achieve broader public ends.  
Network governance emphasizes the structural properties of social networks, including 
constructs like trust, reciprocity, status, prestige, and broader cultural values (Powell 2003). 
Network governance suggests complex public problems cannot be addressed by individual 
organizations or government agencies alone, shifting attention to the structural properties of 
networks rather than management or influence of incentives at the actor level (Agranoff 2006). 
As such network governance often crosses the boundaries of public, private, and non-profit 
sectors. However, organizations party to governance networks are neither strongly managed by 
government agencies, nor are they fully adversarial in the market sense of competitive advantage 
(Ansell and Gash 2008). Rather, actors remain autonomous but are non-trivially dependent on 
access to the heterogeneously distributed resources of their network partners. 
As Provan and Kenis (2008) suggest, network governance has tended to display three 
generic modalities: the participant governed model, the lead organization model, and the network 
administrative organization (NAO) model. The first is a decentralized model having no lead 
organization, while the second is a centralized network model where a dominant organization 
leads a network of inter-organizational relationships. In contrast to both, the NAO represents a 
middle ground scenario, where a new organization is established to govern the network of 
relationships, but which is external in some sense to the industry it is designed to govern. In the 
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private sector context, the NAO is often a non-profit organization specifically designed to 
coordinate activities between private sector organizations (Human and Provan 2000). As a non-
profit, the NAO is not a direct competitor with members of the broader inter-organizational 
network. The NAO may be conceptualized as a type of organizational intermediary or 
“collaborative platform” designed to facilitate cooperative behavior between organizations 
(Ansell and Gash 2018).  
Wardenaar, de Jong, and Hessels (2014) suggest the network governance approach 
provides a useful conceptualization of strategic research consortia in science and technology 
policy. In this article, we conceptualize the government sponsored research consortium, 
Sematech, as a mode of network governance closely related to the NAO model, where Sematech 
has administrative capacity with respect to a sub-network within a broader global network of 
alliances (see section two for details about Sematech). This conceptualization suggests that 
government intervention may provide the capacity necessary to enhance the network 
effectiveness of organizations on rapidly changing technological landscapes. By focusing on the 
structural properties of social networks, the network governance approach may represent a more 
sustainable long-term strategy for achieving public ends in science and technology networks. 
Complex Systems: Complexity theory suggests attention to unique generative 
mechanisms that manifest at the systems level. Thurner, Klimek, and Hanel (2018:22) define 
complex systems as “co-evolving multilayer networks”. This definition of complexity suggest 
that complex systems are understood specifically as overlapping and interacted sets of dynamic 
networks. Ladyman, Lambert, and Wiesner (2013) point to the concepts of numerosity and 
interaction, where numerosity simply refers to the fact that complex systems involve numerous 
elements, actors, or agents, while interaction simply means that these elements are all interacting 
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with each other in a non-trivial way. Miller and Page (2009:44) point to the concepts of self-
organization and emergence, where “localized behavior aggregates into global behavior that is in 
some sense disconnected from its origins”. Self-organization is compatible with decentralization 
in network governance. In contrast to top down administration by central agencies, the local 
partnering behavior between organizations gives rise to a less centralized and more adaptive 
structure of interaction where network structure exhibits properties of self-organization such as 
reciprocity, closure, and homophily (Robins, Lewis, and Wang 2012).  
Kauffman (1993) suggested that complex systems can be characterized as fitness 
landscapes. In such systems, organizations cooperate to summit peaks of fitness on technological 
landscapes, where recombination of technology produces novel innovations. A feature of 
evolution on such landscapes is called “catalytic task spaces”. While the original concept was 
designed to describe chemical interactions that give rise to biological processes, the notion can 
be generalized to technology landscapes, where organizations combine their respective resources 
and recombine existing technologies to produce new innovations. The catalytic task space may 
be thought of as a local cluster within the landscape where recombination occurs at an 
accelerated rate. Kauffman’s (1993) notion of a catalytic task space fits well with the idea that 
government might act as a network catalyst. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a catalyst as 
“A substance which when present in small amounts increases the rate of a chemical reaction or 
process but which is chemically unchanged by the reaction; a catalytic agent”. In this sense, if 
governments create local clusters of cooperative behavior, such clusters may catalyze a broader 
process of cooperation on the landscape. While, the metaphor breaks down over whether the 
government remains unchanged in the process, the rate of increase in a chemical reaction maps 
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on well to the notion of increased cooperative behavior in, for example, government sponsored 
consortia. 
Complexity concepts have been applied by public policy and administration scholars, 
including nonlinearity (Morçöl 2012; McGee and Jones 2018), self-similarity, feedback (Eppel 
2017), self-organization (Comfort 1994; Berardo and Scholz 2010), fitness landscapes (Rhodes 
& Dowling 2018), and preferential attachment (Carboni & Milward 2012). However, there has 
been insufficient attention to the nature of complex systems and the application of statistical 
modeling of social networks in the public policy and administration literature (Robins, Lewis and 
Wang 2012). Observations regarding decentralization of governance and increasing cross-sector 
cooperation abound, yet extant concepts from complexity theory remain underutilized given their 
potential for describing these very situations. This article applies a set of complexity concepts to 
understand network governance generically, as well as specific mechanisms of complex systems 
to motivate hypothesis regarding government intervention in inter-organizational networks. 
The specific mechanism of interest in this research is preferential attachment. Preferential 
attachment describes a process where network actors tend to seek out connections with already 
well-connected actors (Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Newman, 2001) and where popularity tends to 
generate increasing popularity (Robbins, Lewis, and Wang 2012). The concept has many 
permutations and precursors such as the Mathew Effect described by the sociologist Robert K. 
Merton (1968), i.e. “the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer”. This process leads to a 
positively skewed distribution of network connections. Such networks often follow a power law 
distribution and are characterized as scale-free when preferential attachment is present, and the 
network is continuously expanding (Barabasi and Albert 1999). However, the question of 
whether many social networks are actually scale-free has come under criticism (e.g. Broido and 
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Clauset 2019) and is beyond the purpose of this article. We apply the concept of preferential 
attachment to suggest that organizations within inter-organizational networks tend to seek and 
form alliances with already well-connected organizations. 
Although preferential attachment is a prominent concept in network analysis, its 
application to the field of public policy and administration has been limited. Literature has 
discussed preferential attachment as a structural feature of social networks (Robins, Lewis and 
Wang 2012; Weare, Lichterman and Esparza 2014). Sun and Cao (2018) used preferential 
attachment to understand the structure and function of Chinese research and development (R&D) 
policy networks, finding that government agencies were more powerful as a result of preferential 
attachment. They argued that policymakers could capitalize on preferential attachment to 
strengthen interagency collaborations. Similar studies on R&D policy networks found that repeat 
participation within the network (Protogerous, Caloghirou, and Siokas 2010) and a broader 
process of self-organization (Biggiero and Angelini 2015) were factors leading to preferential 
attachment within policy networks. Lake and Wong (2009) suggested that preferential 
attachment could enhance political power but also pose challenges when powerful actors are 
removed from centralized networks. Concerns have also been raised regarding network stability 
(Carboni and Milward 2012) and hindrances to the flow of information (Lyles 2015). Schilling 
and Fang (2014) proposed that “moderately hubby” network forms prevent instability, while 
Koliba et al. (2017) suggest improving administrative support in order to build trust between less 
centralized actors.   
R&D alliance networks in the high-technology sector are like other social networks in 
many respects, featuring common processes such as reciprocity, homophily, and preferential 
attachment. Preferential attachment may occur for functional or institutional reasons. 
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Cooperative extensions of the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) suggest that firms seek out 
partnerships in order to gain access to heterogeneously distributed resources which might be 
applied for joint advantage on competitive landscapes (Eisenhardt and Shoonhoven 1996; Das 
and Teng 2000). Thus, firms will tend to seek out partnerships with well-connected firms in 
order to gain access to their deep resource portfolios. Preferential attachment also highlights the 
relevance of social resources and social capital (Lin 1999), as well as drivers of alliance 
formation related to cognitive and institutional processes (Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Powell et al. 
2005). For example, Stuart (1998) showed that prestige is a factor driving alliance formation in 
the semiconductor industry. For these reasons, we hypothesize that, in the semiconductor 
industry, organizations with many alliances will tend to form even more alliances, i.e., a 
preferential attachment process drives network evolution.  
 
H1: The semiconductor industry network exhibits preferential attachment in the 
distribution of strategic alliances 
 
Network Interventions: Finally, a small but emerging literature on network interventions 
is relevant to the current study. Valente (2012:49) defines network interventions as “the process 
of using social network data to accelerate behavior change or improve organizational 
performance”. Building on network theory developed in the health sector, Valente suggests that 
governments might intervene to stimulate the emergence of a network, to alter the structure of an 
existing network, or to even break up an existing network. As Valente states, 
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"When network data indicate that the network is nonexistent, too fragmented, too 
centralized, or otherwise dysfunctional, there is a need for network change. The 
interventionist should use induction or alteration techniques to create a network 
amenable to change. Once the network is built or restructured, identification and 
segmentation tactics can be used to accelerate change." Valente (2012,52) 
 
The basic propositions that Valente advance is that understanding network structure is 
important and governments might take specific modalities of intervention in order to achieve 
public ends. These include, among others, adding or deleting nodes, adding or deleting links, and 
rewiring existing links. One of the most common types of intervention strategies involve 
identifying key players in order to elevate them to leadership positions for policy implementation 
(Valente et al. 2015). We take a different approach, suggesting that government action, via 
Sematech, represents a type of link addition intervention, where the consortium establishes 
network ties between existing firms in an incipient network.  
Scott (2016) suggests that these types of collaborative network interventions have not 
been systematically examined in policy studies. Scott shows that participation in government 
sponsored collaborative groups enhances further collaborative ties between organizations by 
reducing the transaction costs of cooperation in the network. We suggest a similar logic applies 
to Sematech as a mode of network intervention and governance, where the consortium lowered 
cooperation costs that enabled large scale resource combination.  
We combine insights from governance networks, complexity theory, and network 
intervention to advance the hypothesis that governments might catalyze cooperative behavior in 
policy relevant sectors by stimulating the process of preferential attachment around a set of 
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policy relevant target firms in an emerging network. By creating a task space around a set of 
target organizations, governments might catalyze a broader process of preferential attachment. In 
the present case, members of the government sponsored research consortium, Sematech, are the 
policy relevant targets of intervention.  
 
H2: Government intervention stimulates preferential attachment around a set of public 
policy relevant target firms, i.e. Sematech members 
 
Since the implementation of the Sematech program occurred over time, the effects are 
likely time dependent. Following existing literature on Sematech (Browning and Shetler 2000; 
Carayannis and Alexander 2004), we distinguish primarily between an implementation phase, a 
maturity phase, and a post-DOD phase of implementation. Government sponsorship likely 
enhances the network capacity of the consortium, while the sponsorship and exclusion of foreign 
firms from the consortium likely enhances the prestige of the members. Such increases in social 
capital further contribute to a process of preferential attachment. Thus, we hypothesize that the 
preferential attachment effect will be strongest during the implementation and maturity phase of 
government sponsorship.  
 
H3: The strongest Preferential attachment effect for Sematech occurs during the 
implementation and maturity periods of government sponsorship; a weaker effect is 
expected in the post-DOD period 
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4. Data, Methods, and Variables 
Data Sources: Data on network connections between firms were gathered from two 
principal sources. Data from 1986-1989 were gathered from public announcements compiled 
through press releases and other public news announcements. Data from 1990 to 1999 were 
gathered from the Strategic Reviews annual reports from the semiconductor market research firm 
IC Insights. The reports include strategic profiles for firms in a given year. Network connections 
between firms are operationalized by each focal firm’s list of partners and their business 
relationships, including co-development agreements, cross-licensing agreements, equity 
investments, joint ventures, marketing agreements, and mergers. In the business literature, these 
types of relationships are characterized as strategic alliances (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996). 
The alliances represent reciprocal exchange of resources, including financial resources, social 
and human capital, technology, and information. The data also included firm level data on sales 
and headquarters location. Sematech members were identified by contacting Sematech. The 
strategic alliance data were used to create undirected binary networks for each year between 
1987 to 1999. These time periods were chosen because the implementation of Sematech started 
in 1987, the maturity of Sematech began roughly in 1991, and the post-DOD sponsorship era of 
Sematech occurred with DOD-exit in 1996 (Browning & Shetler 2000).  
Stochastic Network Analysis Methods: We use two different stochastic network analysis 
methods, which we attempt to model in parallel form: 1) exponential random graph modeling 
(ERGM) of a network of 283 organizations; and 2) stochastic actor-oriented modeling using 
RSiena (SIENA) of a network of 451 organizations. We use these two methods to fit the 
structure of the data in two separate time periods. Because the early alliance data between 1987 
and 1989 included only announcements, which did not also include data on ongoing alliances, 
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we are unable to track the evolution of the network during these years. Thus, for the early period 
we used ERGM on a pooled network that consisted of all ties formed between 1987 and 1990. 
Conversely, data from 1990 forward included ongoing alliance information, which allowed for 
the use of SIENA to model the network dynamics over time. We include analogous modeling 
terms in both approaches to maintain continuity between the two different methods.   
ERGM is a method for estimating the probability of tie formation between nodes in a 
network (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013). Ties that form within a network are not 
independent of one another creating dependencies that are not appropriately accounted for with 
traditional statistical methods, such as logistic regression (Butts 2008, Snijders 2011). ERGMs 
approximate a maximum likelihood estimate of the coefficients through a Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) simulation process and take the following form (Robins 2007):  
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦) = (
1
𝑘
) 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {∑ 𝜂𝐴𝑔
𝐴
𝐴(𝑦)} 
Multiple configuration types, including structural effects, nodal attributes, and homophily 
effects can be contained in gA(y). The structural effects are endogenous terms whose value 
depends on the configuration of the network. Unlike actor attribute effects and homophily 
effects, which only rely on the two members of the dyad to determine their value, structural 
effects are dependent on the rest of the ties in the network.  These terms are included to capture 
self-organizing properties of the network.  The model parameters, ηA, estimate the relative 
importance of each configuration.  The parameters are estimated and updated until the observed 
networks become central in the distribution of networks simulated from the current model.  In 
other words, the model reaches convergence when the model parameters make the observed 
network the most probable (Lusher, Koskinen and Robins 2013).  
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The data from 1990-1999 include information on ongoing alliances and alliance 
dissolution, permitting stochastic actor-oriented modeling. In order to explore the formation and 
evolution of cooperative relationships in the semiconductor industry, we use the RSiena 
(Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analyses) program in R, simply referred to as 
SIENA models. SIENA models are an appropriate analytic tool when one has a panel of network 
observations. SIENA models are continuous-time Markov chain models where tie changes are 
determined by the current state of the network and whose parameters are estimated through a 
series of simulations (Snijders et al. 2010). The models are actor-oriented in the sense that the 
network evolves through each actor’s decisions about which ties to dissolve, maintain, and form 
in the network. While data consists of snapshots of the semiconductor industry, changes in the 
network take place continuously during the time elapsed between consecutive periods.  
SIENA models have two main components. A timing process which determines the 
number of opportunities an actor has to update the network (i.e., create, maintain, or dissolve a 
tie) and a choice process driven by an objective function which determines the probability that an 
actor makes a particular update. Thus, SIENA models estimate the underlying and unobserved 
network evolution through a series of micro-steps taken by each actor in the network. Based on 
the language and notation in Ripley et al. (2019, p. 119), the network objective function for actor 
i is defined as: 
𝑓𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑥) =  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝑡
𝑘
𝑠𝑖𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑥) 
where 𝛽𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝑡 are the parameters and 𝑠𝑖𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝑡are the effects. Based on the network objective function, 
each actor’s utility of dropping an existing tie, forming a new tie, or maintaining his or her 
existing network is assessed, and a probability assigned.  If the value of the objective function 
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increases for the formation of a particular tie, then the probability of that action occurring also 
increases.  
SIENA models were originally developed for directed networks based on the assumption 
that a tie’s existence is determined by the sender of the tie. Recent developments have extended 
these models to non-directed networks, such as those found in the semiconductor industry as 
well as in a wide variety of governance networks. As discussed by Snijders and Pickup (2016), 
non-directed networks require adjustments to the timing process and the choice process.1 We rely 
on a one-sided opportunity process and a mutual choice process to model the dynamics of the 
semiconductor industry. We selected this combination because a one-sided initiative with mutual 
confirmation “is in most cases the most appealing simple representation of the coordination 
required to create and maintain non-directed ties” (Snijders and Pickup 2016, p. 233). We 
believe this methodological choice best approximates the process of strategic alliance formation 
in practice, e.g. co-development agreements as a mutual contract representing a mutual pooling 
of resources but for strategic objectives (e.g. Eisenhardt and Shoonhoven 1996). Firm entry and 
exit (i.e., composition change) in the semiconductor industry is controlled for in the model 
through structural zeros (see Ripley et al. 2019). 
Model Terms and Variables: In order to establish continuity across the two modelling 
techniques, we employ parallel modelling strategies with analogous terms between the two 
approaches. Both the ERGM and SIENA models employ three types of effects: structural effects, 
                                                 
1 These new options arise because the formation of a tie can longer be based solely on the utility considerations of 
the sender of the tie.  In non-directed networks, senders and receivers cannot be differentiated and thus one must 
decide how to take into account the utility of each actor.  According to Snijders and Pickup (2016) the timing 
process for non-directed networks has two possibilities: one-sided initiative (where a single actor is randomly 
chosen); or two-sided opportunity (where an ordered pair of actors is randomly selected).  More importantly, the 
choice process has three options: dictatorial (where one actor’s utility determines the tie); mutual (where both actors 
must agree on the tie; in the sense that it is beneficial to both); and compensatory (where a combined objective 
function is established for each pair of actors). 
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actor attribute effects, and homophily effects. We provide generic variable names for analogous 
model terms across ERGM and SIENA models described in Table 1 as well as a brief description 
of their function. 
For structural effects in the ERGMs, the variable of interest for our first hypothesis is the 
geometrically weighted degree distribution, gwdegree. This term captures the skewness of the 
distribution, where a negative estimate indicates a highly skewed distribution (Levy 2016, 
Hunter 2007). This term serves as a measure for a general preferential attachment process in the 
early period of the alliance network. The gwdegree term, as parametrized, captures an anti-
preferential attachment process and thus a negative coefficient provides support for H1 (Hunter 
2007). For the structural effects in our SIENA model we rely on a popularity effect, called 
inPop, to capture the tendency for actors to form ties with others who already have many ties.  
The popularity effect operationalizes the process of preferential attachment hypothesized in H1. 
Unlike the gwdegree term, a positive coefficient on inPop indicates preferential attachment.  
For node attribute effects in the ERGM we use the nodefactor term; and, in the SIENA 
model we use the egoPlusAltX term for undirected networks. These both permit the estimation of 
categorical variables on the probability of tie formation. The key variable of interest is whether 
the node is a Sematech member during time t. We take this term as our basic proxy for Sematech 
induced preferential attachment, as it models the tendency for certain organization types to be 
nominated more than others (i.e., is there preferential attachment to certain node types). These 
Sematech terms serve as our proxy measures for the test of H2. In the ERGM model there is no 
change in Sematech membership for the pooled networks between 1987-1990. For the SIENA 
models Sematech membership changes from year to year.  
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Control variables include main effects for country headquarters, specifically focusing on 
USA and JPN headquartered firms, as well as homophily effects of country and Sematech 
membership. We also control for other self-organizing processes prevalent in networks, such as 
transitivity (i.e. the tendency for actors to form subgroups or triads where all three nodes are 
connected).  In the ERGM this is captured by geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner 
distribution term, called gwesp; and, in the SIENA model this is captured by the transTriad term. 
Lastly, a density parameter is also included in the models. In the ERGM this is the edges term; 
while the SIENA model is degree(density). This variable functions similarly to an intercept term 
in a standard linear model and captures the overall tendency for ties to form in the network.  
 
Table 1 – Description of Variables 
 
Independent Variables Definition ERGM Term SIENA Term 
Pref.Attach Orgs with ties gain more ties gwdegree inPop 
Sematech Effect Sematech members gain more ties nodefactor egoPlusAltX 
Control Variables    
Sematech Homophily Sematech members form ties with 
Sematech members 
nodematch sameX 
USA Effect USA orgs form more ties nodefactor egoPlusAltX 
USA Homophily USA orgs form ties with USA orgs nodematch sameX 
JPN Effect JPN orgs form more ties nodefactor egoPlusAltX 
JPN Homophily JPN orgs form ties with JPN orgs nodematch sameX 
Org. Size Three year moving average of sales 
for org-year 
-- egoPlusAltX 
Transitivity Tendency of network to form triads gwesp transTriad 
Density The overall density of the network edges degree(density) 
 
Table Notes: the table shows the name of each variable, the definition, the ERGM term name, and the SIENA term 
name. ERGM term for Org.Size is blank because ERGM nodecov requires non-missing data for continuous 
variables. 
 
 
5. Results 
The results of the exponential random graph models (ERGM) used in the implementation 
period (1987-1990) are below in Table 2. The model and goodness-of-fit diagnostics are in the 
  
21 
 
online appendix, showing good convergence statistics. The first model shows the base ERGM 
with the degree distribution term (Pref.Attachment). The negative estimate indicates high 
skewness in the distribution (Levy 2016, Hunter 2007), which is our proxy for general 
preferential attachment in network tie formation. This result provides support for H1 during the 
early implementation period. In the second model, we add the main effect term (Sematech 
Effect), which captures the tie formation effect of membership in the government sponsored 
network administrative organization. The estimate is significant and positive, and 
Pref.Attachment has now lost its significance. This indicates that the main effect of Sematech 
accounts for a portion of the skewness in the degree distribution. In other words, to the extent 
that the network has a right skew, those high degree nodes can be partially accounted for by 
Sematech membership. The third model adds the transitivity term, control variables for country 
headquarters, and homophily terms for Sematech members and firms of the same country 
headquarters. The effect of Sematech remains positive and significant, while Pref.Attachment 
has reversed sign and is now significant. These results provide support for H2 during the 
implementation period.  
Interestingly, during this period, USA firms appear to have higher propensity for alliance 
formation than JPN headquartered firms; yet USA firms had a negative propensity for forming 
ties with each other. This is consistent with the extremely competitive nature of USA firms, also 
indicating the USA firms have strong alliance formation tendencies with foreign firms despite 
the essentially protectionist nature of Sematech. Finally, Sematech members appear to have a 
positive tendency to form ties with each other during this period. However, the estimate is only 
marginally significant.    
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Table 2 – ERGM Models, Implementation Period (1987 to 1990) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Density -4.0*** -5.019*** -7.529***      
 (0.07) (0.122) (0.299) 
Pref.Attachment -1.463***  -0.178 1.345***      
 (0.158)  (0.21)  0.268 
Transitivity   0.857***     
   (0.082) 
USA Effect   1.921***     
   (0.1903) 
USA Homophily   -1.874***  
   (0.267)   
JPN Effect   0.787***     
    (0.184) 
JPN Homophily    0.179      
   (0.18) 
Sematech Effect   2.18*** 1.264***      
  (0.1)  (0.145) 
Sematech Homophily   0.222 
      (0.161) 
AIC 4691 4224 3982 
BIC 4708 4250 4059 
 
Table Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; standard errors in parentheses; The network includes 283 
organizations. The models are for the implementation period, with pooled yearly networks from 1987-1990. Model 
1 shows the ERGM only with the general preferential attachment measure(gwdeg). Model 2 adds the Sematech main 
effect. Model 3 includes all controls. Goodness of fit diagnostics are shown in the online appendix. 
 
 
Next, we analyzed four distinct time segments, within the maturity period and the post-
DOD period of the evolution of the collaboration network, using stochastic actor-oriented 
models in RSiena (SIENA). Table 3 shows four SIENA models for each three-year time period. 
Each time period is modeled separately to examine how the relevance of the key variables may 
change during the different periods: Model 1, 91-93; Model 2, 93-94; Model 3, 95-95; and 
Model 4, 97-99. All four models indicated good convergence statistics. The absolute value of the 
convergence t-ratios were all less than 0.1 and the overall convergence ratio was less than 0.25 
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(Snijders, van de Bunt, and Steglich 2010).  Goodness-of-fit diagnostics for the SIENA models 
are in the online appendix. 
 
Table 3 – SIENA Models, Maturity to post-DOD period (1991 to 1999) 
 Maturity Period Post-DOD Period 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 Model 4 
  Yrs.91-93 Yrs.93-95 Yrs.95-97 Yrs.97-99 
rate period 1  0.82 ***    1.31 ***     0.62*** 0.82*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) 
rate period 2 0.94*** 1.08 ***   1.23*** 1.19*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Density  -3.32 *** -3.31 *** -3.44 *** -4.76 *** 
 (0.44) (0.39) (0.37) (0.45) 
Transitivity   0.34 ** 0.61 ***  0.57 *** 0.77 *** 
 (0.12)  (0.09) (0.08)  (0.09) 
Pref.Attachment 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
USA Effect -0.04 -0.28* 0.50** 0.06 
 (0.21) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) 
USA Homophily  -0.20 -0.13 -0.45* 0.09 
 (0.20) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) 
JPN Effect 0.83* 0.73* 1.28*** 1.06*** 
 (0.35) (0.26) (0.29) (0.30) 
JPN Homophily 0.15 0.81** 1.14*** 0.66* 
 (0.33) (0.26) (0.29) (0.30) 
Sematech Effect 0.83* -0.68      -0.61* 0.30 
 (0.34) (0.38) (0.31) (0.36) 
Sematech Homophily  0.40 -0.41 -0.86** 0.15 
 (0.36) (0.34) (0.28) (0.34) 
Firm Size Effect -0.16   -0.56 ***      0.07 0.01 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) 
Iterations  3060  3060  3060 2936 
 
Table Notes: ***p<0.001,** p<0.01,*p<0.05; standard errors in parentheses. The networks include a total of 451 
organizations. The first two models represent the maturity period, the second two models represent the post-DOD 
period. Sematech Effect represents the target preferential attachment effect. Goodness of fit diagnostics are shown in 
the online appendix.                     
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In support of HI, all four models show a positive and significant general effect on 
Pref.Attachment. However, our proxy for Sematech induced preferential attachment (Sematech 
Effect) only showed a positive significant effect in Model 1 providing partial support for H2 
during the maturity period. In Model 2 the estimate reverses but is insignificant. Then, in Model 
3 the sign remains negative but becomes significant. The sign becomes positive in Model 4 but is 
insignificant. The reversal of sign during the post-DOD period suggest that the attractiveness of 
Sematech membership on alliance formation were strongest during the implementation period 
and during the first half of the maturity period which supports H3. The reversal of significance 
between Model 1 and 2 may be due to several members leaving the Sematech consortium, while 
the increase in significance of the negative estimate in Model 3 supports H3. In summary, the 
results indicate strong support for H1, moderate support for H2, and moderate support for H3. 
Table 4 summarizes our main results. 
 
Table 4 – Summary of Empirical Results 
 Model Years 
 1987:1990 1991:1993 1993:1995 1995:1997 1997:1999 
Pref. Attachment + + + + + 
Sematech Effect + + ns - ns 
 
Table Notes: the positive coefficient in the ERGM model for 1987:1990 indicates a tendency away from preferential 
attachment, while the positive coefficients for the SIENA models indicate a tendency toward preferential 
attachment.   
 
 
 
The control variables also showed interesting estimates. The positive and negative signs 
on Sematech homophily appear to correlate with the main Sematech Effect, suggesting that when 
Sematech members form alliances with each other, they also seek alliances with others. 
Sematech homophily is strongly negative in the immediate post-DOD period, perhaps suggesting 
that Sematech substitutes for alliance formation between USA firms and foreign firms. JPN firms 
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show a higher propensity for collaboration across the time periods and a higher propensity to 
collaborate with other JPN firms, while USA firms only appear to show positive tie formation in 
the immediate post-DOD period and show a consistent negative propensity to collaborate with 
other USA firms.  
 
6. Discussion 
The study posed three hypotheses regarding alliance formation in the semiconductor 
strategic alliance network: H1) a general preferential attachment process is present in the 
distribution of network ties; H2) a government sponsored consortium, structured as a network 
administrative organization (NAO), stimulates this process; and H3) the effects are time 
dependent and differ during and after government sponsorship. The results show that preferential 
attachment operates in the industry network generically, but the situation regarding target 
organizations is more nuanced. The results indicate that NAO membership is associated with 
rapid tie formation in the implementation and early maturity periods of the development of the 
program. However, this effect appears to diminish and even reverse as the consortium proceeds 
through the maturity period and then enters the post-DOD period. This may be due to saturation 
in alliance formation as target firms reach a threshold of utility for new alliances, which supports 
observations regarding diminishing returns to alliance portfolio size (Oxley 1997; Lahiri and 
Narayanan 2013). As such, there may be limits to government sponsorship efforts aimed at firms 
with large alliance portfolios.  
 The results have implications for the network governance literature in public policy and 
administration (Provan and Kenis 2008) by suggesting preferential attachment is a property of 
social networks which might be stimulated, attenuated, or generically manipulated to achieve 
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public goals. Rather, than creating new public bureaucracies, providing direct subsidies to 
private firms, or enacting trade barriers in the international system, this research suggests that 
governments might act upon social structure rather than the agents themselves. Further, this 
study synthesizes the literature on network interventions (Valente 2012) and complexity with 
network governance in order to more fully explore the theoretical underpinnings of inter-
organizational networks, as well as the role of governments within these networks. We 
conceptualize the NAO approach in the Sematech case as a tie-addition intervention, but further 
suggest a positive feedback loop where adding ties among existing node sets may stimulate the 
development of more ties. This is evident because the propensity of USA firms to form ties with 
other USA firms is largely negative or insignificant across all time periods, suggesting that the 
NAO permits cooperation between firms which otherwise are highly competitive. A tie addition 
strategy through alliance sponsorship may provide the needed governance structure to reduce 
cooperation costs and permit resource combination.   
 The results also contribute to the literature on strategic alliances by emphasizing the role 
of public policy in private sector alliance formation. While the extant literature in this area 
focuses chiefly on transaction costs, resource-based view of the firm, and social capital, there has 
been limited treatment of public policy effects on strategic alliance behavior. The results 
reinforce the general notion that USA firms are highly competitive, and indeed, appear to form 
cooperative ties with a lower propensity than JPN firms during the maturity and post-DOD 
periods. However, USA firms do appear to be more cooperative during the implementation 
period, which, as we argue, is due to the influence of the NAO during the early crisis period 
between 1987-1990. The norm also appears to reverse during the immediate period following 
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DOD exit, as USA firms are forming alliances at a more rapid rate with firms of other national 
headquarters, i.e. higher tie formation simultaneous with negative homophily.  
 Limitations: The first limitation deals with the issue of missing data on ongoing alliances 
in the early years, limiting the analysis of that period to a pooled ERGM rather than the SIENA 
model. This pooling approach to the ERGM in the early years may discount information on 
temporal dynamics. Second, there is no definitive method for directly assessing whether 
preferential attachment is stimulated by select nodes. Rather, preferential attachment generally 
refers to the distribution of ties in a network. As such, we rely on proxy variables in the models. 
Finally, as with all non-experimental designs, we cannot be confident that Sematech is causing 
increases in the probability of tie formation, or whether these increases would have been 
observed in the absence of Sematech. As such, we limit our conclusions to associational claims 
rather than using causal language.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to test whether government intervention can catalyze mechanisms of 
network evolution in strategic industries. Specifically, the focus is on the effects of a policy 
program on the preferential attachment mechanism of the research and development network in 
the high-technology sector. Due to the importance of technology to the national interest, the 
quasi-public nature of technology, and the cooperative character of the semiconductor industry, 
theory suggests that network-based interventions may be useful policy tools in context. The 
general research question we have sought to address is whether government intervention might 
catalyze network formation around a set of policy target organizations. The results of the study 
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provide support for the theory and suggest further research is necessary to explore the dynamics 
of network intervention in strategic industries.   
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Online Appendix – ERGM & SIENA Goodness of Fit Diagnostics 
The statnet program in R was used to produce the goodness-of-fit plots for the ERGM model and 
RSiena was used of for the Siena models. The goodness-of-fit plots demonstrate how well 
networks simulated from the specified model capture "out-of-model" statistics (e.g., shared 
partners, degree distributions, and the triad census).  These out-of-model statistics are global 
properties of the networks that were not directly specified in the local configurations used in the 
ERGM and SIENA models. In the plots below, the thick black line represents a given statistics 
observed value. The boxplots show the simulated networks distribution based on the model 
parameters. The plots show that the out-of-model statistics are well captured the ERGM. For the 
Siena models, the Triad Census is well fit, however, while we capture the shape of the degree 
distribution, we underpredict the number of actual isolates causing slight overprediction for other 
levels of the degree distribution. 
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Figure 1 – ERGM goodness-of-fit diagnostics 
 
 
Figure 2 – SIENA goodness-of-fit diagnostics 
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